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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
ROSEMARY ABBOTT, 
Plaint iff-A ppellant, 
v s . 
BOARD OF EDUCATION OF THE 
NEBO SCHOOL DISTRICT, et a l . . 
Defendants-Respondents . 
RESPONDENTS1 BRIEF 
NA TURE OF CA SE 
Case No. 
14,409 
Appellant , a probat ionary t eacher whose employment contract was 
not renewed for the 1975-76 school y e a r , c l a ims that she was terminated in 
violation of h e r consti tutional r ight to due p r o c e s s and con t ra ry to the Utah 
Orde r ly School Terminat ion P r o c e d u r e s Act because no r ea sons for the non-
renewal or a hear ing thereon were given h e r ; and she seeks an o rde r compelling 
defendants to re ins ta te h e r with al l the r igh t s and benefits to which she would 
be entitled had she been re -employed . 
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DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The case was tried to the Court on November 12, 1975, the Honorable 
George E . Ballif, presiding. The Court found that appellant failed to establish 
any of her claims and entered judgment dismissing the complaint with prejudice. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondent seeks affirmance of the judgment of the t r ial court. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
This case was submitted to the Court on a written statement of facts. 
Additional evidence was presented to and received by the Court at the t r ia l . 
Respondent does not controvert the facts as set forth in appellant's 
brief, but deems the following additional facts to be controlling: 
1. Appellant was a "qualifying educator11 as distinguished from a 
"career educator" as those terms are used in the agreement between the school 
district and its educators (Plaintiff's Exhibit No. 14). 
2. Career educators are those holding Utah teaching certificates 
who have been employed by the school district for three consecutive years 
(Plaintiff's Exhibit No. 14, section 5-3-1). They have tenure or a right to 
re-employment (Section 5-4) and may be terminated only for cause after notice 
and a hearing (Sections 17-1-1 et seq.) . 
3. Qualifying educators are those who have not attained career status. 
They are employed for one school year (Plaintiff's Exhibit No. 14, section 5-6). 
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If the board decides not to re-employ them, they are entitled to written 
notice sixty days before the end of the school year stating that their contract 
will not be renewed (Section 5-7). 
4. Appellant's contract entitled her to a hearing on claims based 
upon an event or condition affecting the interpretation, meaning or application 
of the provisions of the agreement between the school district and its 
educators, but specifically excluded claims not based upon an event or 
condition of said agreement (Plaintiff's Exhibit No. 14, Section 18-1-1). 
5. That agreement made no requirement that a qualifying educator 
employed for a period of one school year be given the reasons for not renewing 
such educator's employment contract (Plaintiff's Exhibit No. 14, Sections 
5-5, 5-6, 5-7). 
6. Under the Utah Orderly School Termination Procedures Act, 
the nonrenewal of an educator's employment contract constitutes a ,fterminationM 
only if that educator has a "reasonable expectation of continued employment 
in successive years pursuant to the employment practices of the school 
distr ict" (Section 53-51-3 (2) (b) Utah Code Annotated 1953, as enacted 1973); 
and the notices and reasons for nonrenewal provided for by the termination 
procedures under the Act need be given to only those individuals "entitled 
to employment in succeeding years according to district personnel program" 
(Section 53-51-5 (2), Utah Code Annotated 1953, as enacted 1973). 
- 3 -
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
APPELLANT, AS A QUALIFYING EDUCATOR, DID NOT HAVE A 
CONTRACTUAL RIGHT TO RE-EMPLOYMENT OR AN EXPECTANCY OF 
CONTINUED EMPLOYMENT WHICH WOULD AMOUNT TO AN INTEREST IN 
"PROPERTY" PROTECTED BY THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT TO THE 
CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES. 
The decisions of the United States Supreme Court do not support 
Appe l l an t s c l a ims . On June 29, 1972, the United States Supreme Court decided 
the cases of Board of Regents v Roth, 408 U S 574, 92 S Ct 2701, 33 L Ed 2d 
548, and P e r r y v Sindermann, 408 U S 593, 92 S Ct 2694, 33 L Ed 2d 570, 
holdingthat the Constitution does not requi re that a nontenured teacher be 
afforded a hearing or r easons for his nonretention unless it can be shown that 
the nonretention deprived the teacher of some in te res t in "liberty11 (which is 
not an issue in this case) or "property11 protected by the Four teenth Amendment . 
Roth was hired by Wisconsin State Univers i ty-Oshkosh for his f i rs t 
teaching job for a fixed t e r m of one academic y e a r . He completed the year 
but was informed he would not be r eh i r ed . Under univers i ty r u l e s he was 
given no reasons for the decision and no opportunity to challenge the same at 
any sor t of hearing because he had no tenure r igh t s under state law. Roth sued 
claiming that the failure to give him the r e a s o n s for his nonretention and an 
opportunity for a hearing violated his r igh ts to p rocedu ra l due p r o c e s s . The 
-4-
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Court declared that the Fourteenth Amendment does not require a statement 
of reasons or a hearing on the decision not to rehire a nontenured teacher 
unless it can be shown that the nonrenewal deprives the teacher of an interest 
in "liberty11 or a "property" interest in continued employment; and since the 
te rms of Roth's employment specifically provided that it would terminate at 
the end of the academic year he had no "property" interest protected by 
procedural process . 
Sindermann had taught for some ten years at three different instit-
utions in Texas. After four years at the last institution (which had no 
formal tenure system), his one year teaching contract was not renewed. 
He was given no reasons for the nonrenewal and no opportunity to challenge 
the basis therefor. In his suit, he too made a claim that his right to 
procedural due process had been violated. The Court again stated that a 
teacher must show that the decision not to rehire him deprived him of a 
"property" interest in continued employment to invoke the protection of 
procedural due process. However, it went further and stated that such a 
"property" interest could be found in a de facto tenure policy arising from 
rules and understandings officially promulgated; but it explicitly declared 
that a mere subjective expectancy of re-employment was not protected by 
procedural due process . 
Appellant's contract was for one school year. Appellant was first 
employed by the school district during the 1973-74 school year. She was then 
rehired to teach the following year. Her contract specifically provided that as 
- 5 -
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a qualifying educator she was employed for a period of one school year 
(PlaintiffJs Exhibit No. 14, Section 5-6). She completed her teaching contract 
for that year, and in accordance with the provisions thereof was timely and 
properly notified that her contract would not be renewed for the coming 
school year (a matter which she does not contest). 
Appellant's contract gave her no right to re-employment. Appellant, 
not having been employed by the school district for three consecutive years , 
had no tenure or right to re-employment under the agreement between the 
district and its educators (Plaintiff's Exhibit No. 14, Sections 5-3-1 and 5-4). 
She was entitled to and did receive notice of nonrenewal sixty days before the 
end of the school year. When she completed the school year for which she was 
hired, her employment ended as provided by her contract. 
Appellant had no expectancy of continued employment. Although 
appellant argues that the practices and the policies of the school district 
created in her a reasonable expectancy of continued employment, it is to 
be noted that the record is devoid of evidence in support of her claim. She 
did not testify at the tr ial , no facts were stipulated to, and there is no 
documentary evidence from which it can be concluded that she had even a 
mere subjective expectancy of re-employment. All that the evidence shows 
is that the school district gives official notice of nonrenewal to very few of 
its qualifying educators. There is no evidence that appellant was aware of 
that fact or in any way based an expectancy of continued employment thereon. 
- 6 -
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In the recent case of LaBorde v Franklin Par ish School Board, 
510 F 2d 590 (Ct of Appeals, 5th Cir , 1975), the teacher claimed that 
not only had the assistant superintendent told her that he planned to recom-
mend her for tenure, but that the school board had rarely failed to renew 
the contract of a teacher who had taught for three yea r s . The Court held 
there had been no violation of her procedural due process rights and stated that 
"An expectancy of r e - e m p l o y m e n t s that t e rm is used in both Roth and 
Sindermann, connotes more than a personal feeling on the part of the teacher. 
The mere fact that the school board may not have exercised its prerogative 
to terminate other teachers at the end of their third teaching year does not 
negate their right under Louisiana Law to follow that practice. f f 
The case of Siler v Brady Independent School District, 393 F Supp 
1143 (U S Dist Ct, W D Texas, 1975) also considered the matter of an 
expectancy of re-employment. There the plaintiff's theory was that the 
district had a de facto tenure system which accorded him the reasonable 
right to expect re-employment because of past actions of the board in the 
manner in which they had handled the employment of their teachers and 
because of certain statements that had been made from which all teachers 
could conclude that they had a reason to expect re-employment so long as 
they did a "good job. , f The Court found the evidence insufficient to show that 
the plaintiff had a property right in his expectancy of re-employment. 
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It further found that the plaintiff had failed to show that he had placed 
any reliance on the district 's program of re-employment as a result of any action 
taken by the board or superintendent directly with him. 
The TenthQrcuitCourt of Appeals considered procedural due process 
claims in the case of Bertot v School District No. 1, Albany County, Wyoming, 
522 F 2d 1171 (1975) with similar results . Two "initial contract teachers n 
(as distinguished from Continuing contract teachers" under the Wyoming 
statute) claimed procedural due process deficiencies in connection with the 
nonrenewal of their one year contracts. Relying on the proposition that agree-
ments may be implied though not formalized, and explicit contractual 
provisions may be supplemented by other agreements implied from the 
promisor 's words and conduct in the light of surrounding circumstances, the 
teachers pointed to proof of words and acts of the school officials, including 
a board member's statement that the board had never failed to rehire a 
teacher since 1966 when he came on the board, the superintendent's statement 
that approximately 90 percent of the initial contract teachers are rehired, 
and the principal's statement that if the teacher 's services were satisfactory 
she would certainly be re-employed. In holding that plaintiff's proof had 
shown no "common law" of re-employment, the Court stated that the defendants' 
conduct and the statements made to the plaintiffs could not be equated to 
promissory representations or to words, conduct and usage importing an 
agreement and they did no more than state obvious facts. 
- 8 -
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The only evidence presented by the appellant in this case in support 
of her claim that she had a reasonable expectation of employment in 
succeeding years was the past actions of the school board in connection 
with the employment of its qualifying educators. In all of the foregoing 
cases , such evidence was found to be inadequate and insufficient to create 
an expectancy of re-employment protected by procedural due process, 
POINT II 
AN EDUCATOR MUST HAVE A REASONABLE EXPECTATION 
OF CONTINUED EMPLOYMENT OR BE ENTITLED TO EMPLOYMENT IN 
SUCCEEDING YEARS FOR THE PROVISIONS OF THE UTAH ORDERLY 
SCHOOL TERMINATION PROCEDURES ACT TO A PPLY. 
The Utah Orderly Termination Procedures Act differs from the 
usual tenure legislation. The Utah law (Sections 53-51-1 et seq. , Utah Code 
Annotated, 1953, as enacted in 1973) was enacted the year following Roth 
and Sindermann, supra. It is not a teacher tenure law granting specific 
tenure rights to teachers and making them subject to removal only for 
certain enumerated causes and in a prescribed manner. Rather, it is leg-
islation directed to the school distr icts of the State requiring them to adopt 
termination procedures by contract with their educators or by resolution of 
the board (Section 53-51-4). The rights of teachers would appear to arise 
out of any such contracts or resolutions. In this case the district and its 
educators negotiated and agreed on termination procedures which were 
- 9 -
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included in the contract between them (Testimony of Joe A. Reidhead, 
Transcript page 26); but distinguished between career educators and 
qualifying educators, the latter not being accorded all of the r ights of 
a career educator. Respondents believe that the provisions of the Utah 
Act accomodate the termination procedures agreed to by the part ies . 
The purpose of teacher tenure is to promote a better school 
system. Tenure is a concept which has as its objective the promotion 
of the good order and welfare of the state and the school system by pre-
venting the removal of capable and experienced teachers on the basis of 
personal or political considerations. The Utah Act undoubtedly seeks the 
same objective, and the Respondents have pursued this objective by 
granting tenure to its career educators who can be terminated only after 
notice, a specification of cause, and a hearing. However, following the 
philosophy of most tenure systems, the school dis t r ic t ' s contract with its 
educators requires a teacher to serve out a probationary period before 
tenure is granted. 
The reasons for a probationary period are well stated in the case 
of Zimmerman v Board of Education of Newark, 38 N J 65, 183 A 2d 25 
(cert den 371 U S 956, 83 S Ct 508, 9 L Ed 2d 502) where the Court observes 
that nInherent in the tenure legislation is the policy that a board's duty to hire 
teachers requires more than merely appointing licensed instructors; 
it demands that permanent appointments be made only if the teachers are 
-10-
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found suitable for the positions after a qualifying trial period. " It then 
quotes from one of its earl ier decisions where it said in another context: 
"It is difficult to evaluate the character, industry, personality, and 
responsibility of an applicant from his performance on a written examin-
ation or through cursory personal interviews. Knowledge and intelligence 
do not alone [suffice] . . . The crucial test of fitness is how he fares on the 
job from day to day when suddenly confronted by situations demanding a 
breadth of resources and diplomacy. Many intangible qualities must be taken 
into account, and, since the lack of them may not constitute good cause for 
dismissal under a tenure statute, the [employer] . . . is entitled to a period 
of preliminary scrutiny, during which the protection of tenure does not apply, 
in order that it may make pragmatically informed and unrestricted decisions 
as to an applicant's suitability. " (183 A 2d 25, at 29) 
The Utah Act does not require school districts to establish term-
ination procedures for their probationary teachers. The stated purpose of 
the Act is to require school districts to adopt termination procedures and 
specify standards of due process and causes for termination (Section 53-51-2). 
But by definition (Section 53-51-3), termination does not include the failure 
to renew the employment contract of an educator unless that educator has 
a "reasonable expectation of continued employment in successive years 
pursuant to the employment practices of the school district.11 The Utah Act 
further provides that only individuals "entitled to employment in succeeding 
years according to district personnel program" need be accorded the notice 
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and other procedures therein provided relating to the nonrenewal of 
employment contracts (Section 53-51-5). The obvious reason for the 
exclusion of teachers having no expectation of continued employment is 
to allow a period of time for school boards to evaluate the teacher 's 
suitability for employment on a permanent bas is . 
In this case the employment practices of the school district 
gave a right to continued employment only to teachers who had been 
employed for three consecutive years, and that practice was clearly 
spelled out in the agreement between the district and its educators 
(Plaintiff's Exhibit No. 14, Sections 5-3-1 and 5-4). The appellant had not 
attained career status and had no expectation of continued employment. 
Therefore, the Act did not apply to require Respondents to proceed in 
accordance with its provisions in deciding not to renew appellant's contract 
inasmuch as she was not ,!entitled to employment in succeeding years . M 
CONCLUSION 
The evidence in this case shows that appellant was a qualifying 
or probationary teacher, that her employment contract was for a te rm of 
one year, that continued employment was at the discretion of the school 
board, and that the agreement between the district and its educators clearly 
set forth the requirements for attaining tenure. The evidence of the distr ict 's 
past actions in giving notice of non-renewal to but few of its qualifying 
educators is insufficient to show a de facto tenure system or a "common 
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law" of employment, and appellant presented no evidence whatsoever that 
she relied on any words, conduct or usage which would amount to promis-
sory representations creating in her a reasonable expectancy of continued 
employment. When viewed in the light of the decisions of the United States 
Supreme Court and the lower federal courts, the appellants claim that 
her constitutional right to procedural due process was violated is not tenable. 
The decision not to rehire her did not deprive her of any interest in "liberty" 
and she had no "property" interest in continued employment. 
Likewise, appellant's claim that her rights under the Utah Orderly 
School Termination Procedures Act were violated is not tenable when 
viewed in the light of the provisions of that act. In accordance with the 
legislative directive, the school district and its educators entered into a 
contract granting tenure to its career educators and providing orderly 
termination procedures for them in accordance with the statutory guidelines. 
Relying on the provisions of the Act that termination thereunder did not 
include the nonrenewal of a teacher 's contract unless that teacher had an 
expectation of or was entitled to continued employment in succeeding years , 
a probationary period during which a qualifying teacher could be evaluated 
for permanent employment was made an integral part of said contract. 
Respondent's have subscribed to the concept of tenure for career 
educators with it attendant restrictions on their termination. To extend 
those restrictions to probationary teachers as urged by the appellant would 
defeat whatever advantages a tenure system may have. The right to continuing 
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employment should be granted only if the t eacher is found suitable for 
the position after a qualifying t r i a l period* Respondents respectfully 
reques t s that the judgment of the t r i a l court be aff irmed. 
Robert J , Sumsior 
Sums ion and Park 
80 North 100 E a s t 
P rovo , Utah 84601 
Attorney for Respondents 
-14 -
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
